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What would be the implications of a major European power leaving the European 
Union (EU)? Political movements in two of the most influential member states, the 
United Kingdom and France, have courted an EU withdrawal for decades. In recent 
years, however, the potential for a withdrawal has increased drastically due to the rise of 
two populist political parties—Britain’s United Kingdom Independence Party and 
France’s National Front. A British or French withdrawal from the EU would have 
security, economic, and legal implications both domestically and internationally. With 
the change in the EU, other international organizations, including the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), might assume an increased role or be subject to erosion.   
This thesis explores the eurosceptic movement and the causes of such sentiment. 
It then examines the most influential eurosceptic groups in Britain and France, analyzing 
their histories and comparing their goals. This thesis concludes with an assessment of the 
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Two increasingly influential anti-EU political parties—Britain’s United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP) and France’s National Front (FN)—potentially pose an 
existential threat to the European Union (EU). These two populist political groups seek to 
gain control of their countries’ governments and withdraw from the EU. Economic 
concerns, controversial immigration policies, and strong nationalism have turned anti-EU 
sentiment—also known as euroscepticism—into not just a far-right agenda, but an 
increasingly mainstream political movement.  
The possibility of a British or French withdrawal from the EU—colloquially 
known as Brexit or Frexit, respectively—has provoked considerable debate over the 
potential domestic and international effects. Across Europe—but especially in Britain and 
France—eurosceptic political groups are gaining popular support and momentum. While 
the EU is the prime target of eurosceptics, many of the policy themes shared by 
Eurosceptic—such as defending national sovereignty, promoting military autonomy, 
controlling national borders, and strengthening the domestic economy—cause concern 
over possible withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well. 
In fact, France’s FN has explicitly stated its intent to withdraw France from NATO’s 
integrated military command structure.1 What could happen to the EU or NATO if either 
of these major powers withdrew from the EU? This thesis investigates the implications 
for the EU and NATO in the event of a Brexit or Frexit, or both. Furthermore, this thesis 
explores the eurosceptic movement and its causes, introduces the major eurosceptic 
political parties in Britain and France, and analyzes the potential ramifications of a Brexit 
or Frexit, or both.  
                                                 
 1 “Notre Projet: Programme Politique du Front National,” [“Our Proposal: Political Program of 
the National Front”] Front National, accessed March 16, 2016. http://www.frontnational.com/pdf/
Programme.pdf. 
 2 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis investigates the implications for NATO and the EU in the event that 
anti-EU political parties in France and Britain gain majority power or greater influence in 
national policy-making. This thesis will examine the origins of eurosceptic views; discuss 
the most prominent eurosceptic parties in Britain and France; analyze opinion polls, 
electoral results and prospects; analyze interactions between eurosceptic parties; and 
assess the effects that British or French withdrawal from the EU might have on NATO, 
the EU, and the United States. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The growing influence of populist and eurosceptic political groups in Europe has 
the potential to diminish the regional and global benefits of international organizations 
such as NATO and the EU. These eurosceptic parties campaign on the promise of 
withdrawing their countries from the EU. Because NATO and the EU are critical to 
United States foreign policy in the region, the withdrawal of major powers from these 
organizations could require paradigm shifts by U.S. foreign policy strategists.  
Two primary eurosceptic parties, Britain’s UKIP and France’s FN, have garnered 
significant political momentum since 2009. The compounding successes of these minor 
political parties have pressured some of the larger and better established political parties 
into adopting eurosceptic views. As a result, euroscepticism, which was once a far-left or 
far-right radical agenda, has increasingly become mainstream as even moderate political 
parties now espouse elements of its rhetoric.  
This euroscepticism could culminate with the withdrawal of Britain or France (or 
both) from the EU, which could weaken the power of this important organization. 
Moreover, a British or French withdrawal from the EU could result in a loss of 
confidence in the EU as a whole. This loss of confidence could create a “domino effect,” 
with other countries losing confidence and withdrawing from the EU and other 
international organizations—such as NATO. A fragmented Europe void of effective 
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international organizations could increase the risk of conflict. All of these possible events 
would inevitably present challenges for U.S. foreign policy. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Europe without effective international organizations would necessitate changes in 
U.S. national security strategy, and could increase the risk of conflict. International 
institutions like the EU and NATO are instrumental to U.S. foreign policy.2 The liberal, 
Kantian concepts of international organizations and economic interdependence—which 
were expressed in U.S. foreign policy by Woodrow Wilson—still inform U.S. foreign 
policy. The growing influence of populist and eurosceptic political groups in Europe has 
the potential to diminish the regional and global benefits of these international 
organizations, and this risk causes concern for the United States. 
The 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy describes NATO as “the strongest 
alliance the world has ever known.”3 It emphasizes the U.S. relationship with the EU, 
“which has helped promote peace and prosperity across the region.” It recommends that 
the United States work to “deepen NATO-EU ties to enhance transatlantic security.”4  
D. METHODS AND RESOURCES 
This thesis is primarily a historical study of contemporary European political 
trends. It then attempts to identify potential implications in the event of a major power 
withdrawal from the EU or NATO. 
The historical study follows the evolution of two primary eurosceptic parties—
Britain’s UKIP and France’s FN. At initial glance, these parties appear to be similar in 
their domestic and international agendas; however, analysis of their histories and policies 
indicates that the two parties are significantly different. 
                                                 
 2 The White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: United States Government 
Printing Office, 2015), 25. 
 3 Ibid. 
 4 Ibid. 
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This contemporary study is largely based on news media sources. There is 
inherent bias in some news media sources—primarily due to the polarizing nature of 
political news coverage. Thus, an array of competing opinions was studied and examined 
to present competing interpretations and opinions. Unfortunately, scholarly articles and 
published books were insufficient to adequately support this contemporary study.  
Finally, the analysis of implications is based on each nation’s involvement in the 
EU and NATO. Some scenarios are presented to depict the possible outcomes based on 
different actions. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into four chapters, excluding the introduction. Chapter II 
introduces the eurosceptic political movement. This background is instrumental in 
understanding why and how eurosceptic parties have gained popularity in recent years. 
More importantly, the themes supporting the rise of eurosceptic populist parties have 
increasingly been adopted by long-established political parties.  
Chapter III presents the two prominent eurosceptic political parties in Britain and 
France: the UKIP and the FN. Their histories and prospects will be presented in support 
of a comparison. 
Chapter IV offers an analysis of the potential implications for the EU, NATO, and 
the United States if a major power withdraws from the EU. The analysis includes a 
discussion of the EU security apparatus, the NATO–EU relationship, and the potential 
effects on the EU, NATO, and the United States. 
The conclusion provides a succinct culmination of the entire thesis in addition to 
background on early 2016 developments in the eurosceptic movement. The concluding 
assessment considers actions that the United States and its partners might take to avert 
damage to international institutions critical to U.S. foreign policy. 
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II. EUROSCEPTICISM: DEFINITION AND CAUSES 
Euroscepticism consists of anti-EU attitudes or perceptions. Anti-EU sentiments 
and views have existed since the formation of collective European international 
organizations such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European 
Economic Community (EEC). Even before the establishment of the European Union in 
1993, nationalist political parties sought to protect their countries’ sovereignty by 
opposing or seeking reform of collective European organizations. For example, in 1974, 
British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, then the leader of the parliamentary Labour Party, 
threatened Brexit if Britain did not see reform of the EEC.5 In 2002, former British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher called the EU “fundamentally unreformable,” and 
recommended a “fundamental renegotiation of Britain’s terms of EU membership.”6 
Why fight this institution designed to promote economic interdependence, prosperity, 
democracy, and peace? The answer to this question is quite complex; however, 
eurosceptics generally oppose the EU’s economic and open immigration policies, 
including what they deem lax controls over freedom of movement, deplore the perceived 
inefficiency of EU institutions, and object to proposals to form a collective EU military. 
Increasingly, eurosceptics see the EU as a threat to national sovereignty. 
A. PREVALENCE OF EUROSCEPTIC OPINION 
Euroscepticism is present in all EU member states, and in many euroscepticism is 
gaining popular support. Opinion polling and the 2014 European Parliament (EP) election 
results revealed a dramatic increase in the success of eurosceptic candidates who sought 
to abolish the very positions to which they were just elected.7 
                                                 
5 Philip Stephens, “EU Referendum: History Repeated,” Financial Times, September 22, 2015, 
http://ig.ft.com/sites/2015/eu-referendum-1975-archive/. 
 6 Margaret Thatcher, Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World, New York: Harper Collins, 
2002, 321. 
7 William Jordan, “YouGov Europe: The Swing to the Euroskeptic Right,” YouGov, May 14, 
2014, https://today.yougov.com/news/2014/05/14/yougov-europe-swing-eurosceptic-right/. 
 6 
The EU conducts Eurobarometer polling twice a year. As depicted in Figure 1, the 
most recent Eurobarometer has revealed that the overall positive view of the EU has 
decreased by more than 20 percent since 2006 (50 percent decreased to 37 percent). The 
total negative image has increased by over 50 percent (15 percent increased to 23 
percent).8 
Figure 1.  December 2015 Eurobarometer opinion poll regarding positive, 
neutral, negative image of the EU 
 
Source: “Standard Eurobarometer 84 Autumn 2015: Public Opinion in the European Union,” European 
Commission, last modified December 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/
index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/70150. 
The most recent Eurobarometer, conducted in December 2015, indicated that the 
top three concerns of the Europeans polled were immigration, terrorism, and the 
economic situation (see Figure 2).9 Immigration showed a significant same-year increase 
probably due to the influx of migrants from North Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Middle 
East. Terrorism also received a same-year increase, probably due to the November 2015 
terrorist attacks in Paris and the threat of terrorist attacks by the Islamic State and other 
                                                 
 8 “Standard Eurobarometer 84 Autumn 2015: Public Opinion in the European Union,” European 
Commission, last modified December 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion 
/index.cfm/ ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/70150. 
 9 Ibid. 
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extremist organizations. Finally, the economic situation has been affected by the 2008 
recession and the Eurozone crisis in Greece. 
Figure 2.  December 2015 Eurobarometer opinion poll regarding most 
important issues facing the EU 
 
Source: “Standard Eurobarometer 84 Autumn 2015: Public Opinion in the European Union,” European 
Commission, last modified December 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/
index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/70150. 
The 2014 EP elections provide further evidence of the increasing euroscepticism. 
The fundamentally eurosceptic party in Britain, the UKIP, increased its EP seats from 13 
to 24, becoming the largest British political party in the EP.10 In France, the FN increased 
its EP seats from three to 24, becoming the largest French political party in the EP.11  
The UKIP and the FN were only two of the eurosceptic parties to gain seats. 
Denmark’s eurosceptic Danish People’s Party finished first in the country, taking one 
seat each from the Social Democrats and Venstre—two parties largely in control of 
                                                 
 10 Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou, “2014 EP Elections,” 286. 
 11 Ibid. 
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Danish politics.12 In Hungary, the eurosceptic Jobbik party finished second, with nearly 
15 percent of the vote.13 The eurosceptic Freedom Party of Austria  finished third, but 
gained two additional seats in the EP.14 In Finland, the eurosceptic Finns Party finished 
third, but was one of the two Finnish parties which each gained an additional seat in the 
EP.15 Greece’s Golden Dawn eurosceptic party finished third, but gained three additional 
seats in the EP.16 
B. CAUSES OF EUROSCEPTICISM 
Supporters of euroscepticism argue that the movement is a legitimate uprising of 
the people against EU policies. This uprising is largely a result of nationalist sentiment, 
which is widely regarded as the primary contributing factor to euroscepticism.17 This 
nationalism combines with a tendency to blame domestic problems on the EU and, 
instead of reform, eurosceptics advocate national withdrawal from the EU or its 
abolishment.18 
The causes behind the increased nationalism reside, in part, in the economic 
recession and the perception of immigration problems. Public opinion polls have 
consistently listed economic issues as the top issues facing the EU. In the fall of 2014, the 
EU-conducted opinion poll, the Eurobarometer, listed “economic situation,” 
“unemployment,” and “the state of member states public finances,” as the top three issues 
                                                 
 12 Daphne Halikiopoulou and Sofia Vasilopoulou, “Support for the Far Right in the 2014 
European Parliament Elections: A Comparative Perspective,” Political Quarterly 85, no. 3 (July 2014): 
286. 
 13 Ibid. 
 14 Ibid. 
 15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Daphne Halikioloulou, Kyriaki Nanou, and Sofia Vasilopoulou, “The Paradox of Nationalism: 
The Common Denominator of Radical Right and Radical Left Euroscepticism,” European Journal of 
Political Research, 51, no. 4 (June 2012): 504–539. 
18 Rowena Mason and Patrick Wintour, “Elections 2014: Farage Says UKIP May Have Common 
Ground with Le Pen’s Front National: Leader Says Joint Vote May Form ‘Blocking Minority’: Eurosceptic 
Parties Would Look for Like-Minded Allies,” Guardian, May 22, 2014.  
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facing the EU.19 A close runner-up was immigration, which is inextricably linked to 
economic issues. Critics of the EU’s immigration policies object to freedom of movement 
within the EU (for instance, Eastern Europeans migrating to the UK) and asylum for 
refugees, economic migrants, and other non-Europeans seeking residence and citizenship 
in the EU (for example, North Africans migrating to France). Marine Le Pen took it a 
step further and identified the EU’s liberal free movement as a precipitating factor of the 
Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks in Paris in January 2015.20 The EU’s immigration 
problems are only worsening, and the September 2015 migrant quota reform which was 
intended to share the burden of refugees among member states appears to have further 
bolstered public support for the eurosceptic parties’ agendas. Germany’s chancellor, 
Angela Merkel, has supported sharing migrants while eurosceptics in Britain vehemently 
oppose doing so.21 This sentiment has persisted. According to the December 2015 
Eurobarometer, the top concern continues to be immigration. 
Additionally, among the most documented complaints by British eurosceptics is 
the cost of membership in the EU. In 2014, Britain’s contribution to the EU was €15.32 
billion. Even though UK citizens pay less than the average of €0.77 per EU citizen per 
day, the UK’s contribution amounts to €0.65 per EU citizen per day.22 Britain does not 
pay the most, and the disparity between what the British contribute and what they receive 
is not the largest; however, British media and politicians have used this disparity as yet 
another reason for a Brexit. 
Other complaints have been voiced by top politicians. British Prime Minister 
David Cameron, a Conservative, remarked at the 2014 EU summit that “Brussels has got 
                                                 
19 “Standard Eurobarometer 82 Autumn 2014: Public Opinion in the European Union,” European 
Commission, last modified December 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-2702_en.htm. 
 20 Marine Le Pen, “To Call This Threat by its Name: France Was Attacked by Islamic 
Fundamentalism,” International New York Times, January 18, 2015. 
21 Ian Traynor, “EU Plans Migrant Quotas Forcing States to ‘Share’ Burden,” Guardian, May 10, 
2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/10/european-commission-migrant-quota-plan-
mediterranean-crisis. 
22 “EU Budget: Myths and Facts,” European Commission, accessed June 2, 2015, 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/explained/myths/myths_en.cfm. 
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too big, too bossy, too interfering.”23 Cameron has since requested reforms similar to 
those sought by Harold Wilson in 1974.24  
C. CRITICISM OF EUROSCEPTICISM 
Critics of euroscepticism typically take a harsh stance against the anti-EU 
sentiment and the political parties that use it to gain populist support. A study published 
in 2009 labeled the eurosceptic movement the “Anti-Political Establishment” (APE).25  
Some critics argue that eurosceptic nationalism is actually rooted in xenophobia 
and racism. Both of the top eurosceptic parties in France and Britain have relationships 
with public figures labeled as racists.26 Britain’s UKIP initially attempted to recruit 
Enoch Powell (1912–1998), who gave his “Rivers of Blood” speech in 1968—a speech 
outlining the supposed “evils” of an immigrant population.27 In France, the founder of 
the FN, Jean-Marie Le Pen, routinely criticized French Jews and described the Holocaust 
as a mere “detail” of World War II (WWII).28 In 2015, a public quarrel between current 
leader Marine Le Pen and her father, Jean Marie Le Pen, led to Jean Marie’s removal 
from the party he established. Conversely, some critics have used what may have been 
isolated and unrepresentative statements by rogue party members as evidence that the 
entire movement or party is xenophobic or racist.29 
                                                 
23 “Brussels Too Big and Too Bossy, Cameron Tells EU Leaders,” BBC News, May 27, 2014 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-27583545. 
24 Stephens, “EU Referendum.” 
25 Amir Abedi and Thomas Carl Lundberg, “Doomed to Failure? UKIP and the Organisational 
Challenges Facing Right-Wing Populist Anti-Political Establishment Parties,” Parliamentary Affairs 62, 
no. 1 (January 2009): 72–87. 
26 Stephen Brasher, “Influences: Dr Alan Sked,” New Statesman 10, no. 448 (April 11, 1997): 25; 
Rowena Mason, “Enoch Powell was Right on Immigration – Farage,” Guardian, January 6, 2014. 
27 “Don’t Deal with ‘Racist’ UKIP – Heseltine,” Daily Mail, October 3, 2013. 
28 Craig R.Whitney, “Le Pen May be Charged for a Remark about the Holocaust,” New York 
Times, October 7, 1998. 
29 Patrick Wintour, “UKIP Member Chosen for Broadcast Suspended as Racist Tweets Emerge: 
Builder Andre Lampitt Called Ed Miliband ‘a Pole’: Farage Regrets Supporter’s Islamophobic Opinions,” 
Guardian, April 25, 2014. 
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III. BREXIT AND FREXIT 
This chapter chronicles the major eurosceptic parties in Britain and France. The 
ultimate goal of the prominent eurosceptic parties is to withdraw their countries from the 
European Union—a Brexit for the United Kingdom, a Frexit for France. The rise of 
eurosceptic parties in both Britain and France has shocked many analysts and political 
elites alike. Britain’s UKIP and France’s FN grew out of a void left by their countries’ 
established political parties, and each struggled in relative obscurity until achieving a 
remarkable amount of momentum since roughly 2009—when the Lisbon Treaty was 
ratified and entered into effect. Both parties have evolved from their formative years and 
have made concerted efforts to gain popular support. As documented below, each party 
has distinct origins but similar reasons for gaining in appeal.  
A. BRITAIN 
Britain has a storied legacy of independence and pride in national sovereignty. To 
some, Britain ruled an admired empire, and the British took tremendous pride in this 
international admiration.30 The continentals were in Europe, and the British were 
markedly separated from this continental Europe. Post-WWII international politics 
changed Britain’s stance. In 1946, Winston Churchill famously called for the creation of 
“The United States of Europe.”31 Such a declaration from Churchill made it appear that 
he desired a strong EU, but serious debate exists over whether Churchill was a believer in 
British participation in a European community or if he was a eurosceptic.32  
The formative post-WWII years may have moved the normally independent 
British toward a stronger union with continental Europe; however, this sentiment was 
short lived. When the concept of creating an ever closer union of European states was 
introduced, many of the British were against it—almost instinctually. One school of 
                                                 
 30 Luigi Barzini, The Europeans (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 42–46. 
 31 Winston Churchill, “Speech to the Academic Youth, University of Zurich” (speech, Zurich, 
Switzerland, September 19, 1946), Council of Europe, https://www.coe.int/t/dgal/dit/ilcd/Archives/
selection/Churchill/ZurichSpeech_en.asp. 
  32 Denis Macshane, Brexit: How Britain Will Leave Europe (London: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 28. 
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thought posits a nation as an “imagined political community” – imagined in the minds of 
humans who may never meet in person.33 Forging Europe into a supranational authority 
is heresy to those, like the British, who have a long tradition of national pride and 
sovereignty. As Margaret Thatcher put it, “Europe is, in fact, more like a state or an 
empire turned upside down. It lacks so much that would provide the solid foundations of 
statehood or imperial power that it can only exist through the satisfaction of accumulated 
vested interests.”34 
In 2016, the possibility of a Brexit exists without its main eurosceptic party, the 
UKIP, gaining power. The UKIP began as a fringe political party advocating British 
independence from continental Europe. The UKIP’s successes led to the mainstream 
Conservative party adopting some of the UKIP’s rhetoric, including a referendum for the 
people to decide whether they want to stay in the EU.  
1. UKIP 
The origin of the current quest for a Brexit begins with Britain’s most influential 
eurosceptic party—the UKIP. Since its inception, the UKIP has transformed from a 
relatively obscure party into one of the top British political parties. It has built upon a 
framework of euroscepticism, fiscally conservative policies, and anti-immigration 
advocacy to generate strong nationalist sentiment. UKIP began as the Anti-Federalist 
League (AFL) in 1991 and formally changed its name to UKIP in 1993. The AFL’s 
founder, Alan Sked, a historian-turned-politician, was a staunch anti-EU advocate. Sked 
remarked that his political beliefs were most influenced by “The ratification of the 
Maastricht treaty immediately after the 1992 general election, during which the major 
parties steadfastly refused to debate it.”35 The Maastricht treaty formally brought the UK 
(and the other treaty parties) into the modern-day EU, and Sked rejected the inclusion of 
the UK in an organization that, he believed, would strip it of its sovereignty. Sked and the 
                                                 
 33 Benedict R. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006). 
 34 Thatcher, Statecraft, 323. 
35 Brasher, “Influences,” 25. 
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UKIP viewed the EU as an inept organization that impeded British prosperity.36 In short, 
the UKIP held that Britain would be better off independent of the EU—hence the party’s 
nomenclature.  
The UKIP’s far-right views led to a relatively calm existence in British politics in 
the first ten years. Sked quit the UKIP in 1997 after he became wary of his party’s 
direction. Concerned about the UKIP’s increased far-right politics, he later remarked, 
“My great regret is that the party I founded has been captured by the radical Right and 
has gone all anti-intellectual. It’s gone completely fruitcake.”37 Even following Sked’s 
departure, the UKIP remained in relative obscurity. In 2009, however, another EU 
treaty—the Lisbon treaty—sparked a resurgence in eurosceptic debate. The treaty offered 
a glimmer of hope to British eurosceptics because it formally established a procedure to 
withdraw from the EU.38 This reinvigoration of euroscepticism and a general discontent 
in the midst of a global recession fueled support for the UKIP’s message.  
The UKIP’s leader since 2010, Nigel Farage, used this opportunity to rally the 
right. This often vilified leader has been at the helm of the party during its dramatic rise. 
Farage has faced numerous obstacles, including assaults by protestors; egg-throwing 
incidents; a plane-crash39; and, of course, his Conservative and Labour party opponents. 
Farage, a member of the EP (MEP), uses his speaking time at the parliament to regularly 
lambast the EU and fellow EP members—typically in dramatic fashion.40 This 
flamboyant style of politics, while unorthodox, seems to appeal to both voters 
disenchanted with the long-established major parties and fellow politicians. Conservative 
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party members have often made high profile defections to the UKIP.41 These defections 
have added further legitimacy to the UKIP’s dramatic rise. 
Naturally, the rise of the UKIP has garnered increased attention—both friendly 
and unfriendly. In 2010, before becoming the FN’s leader, Marine Le Pen remarked that 
she was modeling her toned-down FN after the UKIP rather than another British far-right 
party, the British National Party.42 The unfriendly attention has come from political 
opponents and the media. British Labour and Conservative party politicians routinely 
express concern over the UKIP’s rise.43 Although the UKIP has achieved significant 
successes in EP elections, these elections are viewed as “second-order” elections in 
which voters see “less at stake” than in national elections.44  
The ultimate fear of the Labour and Conservative parties is that the second-order 
elections could result in high levels of publicity for UKIP, which could in turn lead to the 
achievement of similar successes in domestic elections. These fears seem to be 
materializing as the UKIP now has five members in the British parliament. Critics believe 
that the UKIP’s economic, immigration, and euroscepticism policies threaten negative 
changes for Britain if its leaders gain power. Even Alan Sked, the UKIP’s founder, has 
targeted the UKIP, calling it “Frankenstein’s monster.”45 Additionally, the media has 
expressed marvel, alarm, and fear over the UKIP’s rise. Owen Jones, an influential 
British political analyst, remarked, “Farage is a dangerous man, politically speaking, and 
UKIP is a potential menace.”46  
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Despite the alarm, the UKIP of the 2014 EP elections was the strongest yet. EP 
election results showed the largest increase in popular support since the UKIP’s 
inception.47 The UKIP increased its EU parliament seats to 23 of the 73 allocated to 
Britain.48 As mentioned previously, the UKIP also holds three seats in the House of 
Lords and two seats in the House of Commons. The UKIP received tremendous support 
in electoral areas in which it had garnered little support during the last EP election cycle. 
The UKIP’s simplistic and nationalistic approach toward attaining support could be a 
sign of the times. The euroscepticism from its inception has not garnered the support that 
it has achieved recently. Instead, it appears that the combination of euroscepticism, 
nationalism, and growing anti-immigration sentiment has driven the UKIP to the 
forefront of UK political debate. 
Conversely, the UKIP’s rise could potentially be explained by other factors. Most 
of these factors indicate that the UKIP has benefited from the failures of other parties. 
Critics—including Sked—have regularly called UKIP electoral successes a result of 
“protest” votes. Voters are discouraged by current British politics and, when offered a 
different option, are eager to vote for a new party.49 Others have claimed that the UKIP’s 
success is the result of “a mutiny within Conservatism.” Other explanations include the 
theory that the UKIP targets working-class voters who feel “left behind” by the current 
major political parties.50  
Some of these explanations are supported by opinion polls conducted by the EU. 
The Eurobarometer results of December 2014 indicated that only 30% of the British 
respondents polled had a positive view of the EU.51 These results remained the same for 
the December 2015 iteration of the Eurobarometer.52 
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2. Conservatives 
Besides the UKIP, the other British party that could bring about a Brexit is the 
Conservative party. While the UKIP has populist appeal, the Conservative party currently 
has control of the British government in addition to appealing to both the common man 
and the socio-economic elite. The Conservatives gained momentum by adopting some of 
the UKIP’s eurosceptic views. These views are widely held in an increasingly right-
leaning British populace. By and large, however, the Conservatives are not a eurosceptic 
party. Conservatives endorsing the policies of PM David Cameron have repeatedly 
indicated their desire to stay in the EU. Cameron’s promise to conduct an EU referendum 
was made to re-negotiate terms deemed unfavorable to Britain.53 
The appeal of the Conservative party promising an EU referendum proved 
successful in 2015 national elections. The Conservative win shocked the British public 
because numerous opinion polls before the election predicted almost no chance for the 
Conservatives to receive a majority.54 On election day, the exit polling was disbelieved 
so vehemently that Lord Paddy Ashdown, a former leader of the Liberal Democrats, 
appeared on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and stated, “If this exit poll is 
right … I will publicly eat my hat.”55 The exit polls were correct, and the Conservative 
party’s victory moved Britain closer to the possibility of a Brexit.  
Cameron’s campaign promise of a Brexit referendum was made conditional on 
concessions to some of the points of contention raised by the Conservative party.56 The 
Prime Minister’s decision angered some in Britain because it departed from the standard 
British process of parliament deciding international treaty involvement.57 Nevertheless, 
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Cameron requested that the EU change its immigration policies to conform to British 
immigration reform. The leaders of the other European Union member countries and the 
President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, categorically refuse to 
change the EU policies just to appease the British. Even if they could change them, 
Manuel Valls, the French Prime Minister, remarked there would be no new EU Treaty 
before 2017—and Cameron originally promised to hold the British EU referendum by the 
end of 2017.58  
In February 2016, Cameron announced that the EU referendum would be held in 
June 2016. Various factors appear to have encouraged Cameron to hold the referendum 
vote sooner than the end of 2017. First, Cameron apparently fears that delaying the 
referendum vote any further would increase the probability of a Brexit. This fear was 
reinforced when significant Conservative party politicians publicly advocated Brexit after 
Cameron’s list of preferred concessions was received by the EU in February 2016. When 
the referendum vote occurs, the outcome will be dependent on public sentiment at that 
time. Current public opinion polls depict an increasing public sentiment in favor of a 
Brexit. In September 2015, more voters polled backed a Brexit than those who supported 
staying in the EU.59 Additionally, the EU’s Presidency of the Council of the European 
Union is scheduled to shift to the UK in July–December 2017, and Britain would not be 
able to hold the referendum and hold this presidency at the same time.60  
B. FRANCE 
France is not as close to a Frexit as Britain is to a Brexit. EU opinion polls 
indicate that the French population has a higher opinion of the EU than does the British 
population. In addition, France’s most prominent eurosceptic party, the National Front, 
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has a far more difficult task in gaining power in French politics—primarily due to the 
French electoral system, which favors ruling political parties. 
France has been ambivalent about its commitment to the construction of a 
supranational European organization.  This ambivalence began with the opposing 
viewpoints of General Charles de Gaulle and Jean Monnet—a founding father of the 
European Union. After WWII, de Gaulle wished to recreate France as a nation, and 
Monnet viewed the pursuit of a united Europe as a better option.61 De Gaulle viewed 
Europe as “an entity of independent states,” “with no supranational authority” and 
“independent of the United States.” France would be “the dominant power in foreign 
policy” in Europe and “open to the East.”62 Monnet’s view of Europe starkly contrasted 
with that of de Gaulle. Monnet advocated a Europe that would be anti-nationalist, “based 
upon concrete institutions,” “a European Community linked to the United States in a 
strong partnership,” and inclusive of all who wished to join.63 
De Gaulle further defined Europe as “from the Atlantic to the Urals.” He excluded 
the United Kingdom as part of Europe.64  He vetoed Britain’s application to the join the 
European Common Market, also known as the European Economic Community (EEC). 
General de Gaulle accused Britain of harboring a “deep-seated hostility towards 
European construction.”65 
France’s FN has a longer and more complex history than the UKIP. Unlike the 
organizers of the UKIP, the founders of France’s FN did not initially set out to challenge 
their country’s participation in the EU. The FN began as a strong nationalist party 
dedicated to the protection and prosperity of the French people.66 The FN continues to 
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express this sentiment—albeit toned down slightly—in its modern-day policies.67 The 
FN’s euroscepticism has been a natural byproduct of its dedication to all things French; 
since the EU’s establishment in 1993, the FN has opposed it and has promoted 
euroscepticism as a primary policy. Over the years, the FN has evolved into a 
considerably more moderate group than it was at the outset, but it has managed to 
maintain its core tenets.68 To gain a fuller appreciation of its goals and policies, the FN’s 
origins and evolution must be explored. 
The FN was founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen in 1972. In the 1970s, the strong anti-
Gaullist, far-right movement in France led to the rise of multiple right-wing parties. The 
FN attempted to unite these groups and provide an alternative political prospect. The FN 
played the role of the underdog political party in a French political system dominated by 
powerful parties: the Parti Socialiste (PS), the Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR), 
the Parti Communiste Français (PCF) and the Union pour la Democratie Française 
(UDF).69 FN leaders tout themselves as the opposition movement and appeal to those 
dissatisfied with the big French political parties. These anti-Gaullists have used harsh 
anti-immigrant rhetoric to attract votes. The FN has maintained its position as a 
nationalist party and its foremost policy is to promote the vitality of France and the 
French people. In a 1997 campaign pamphlet, the FN summed up its core belief—the FN 
“wants to give back France her vitality and her power, and to the people their pride and 
prosperity.”70 This belief has been expounded upon to imply that the protection was for 
the French only—not immigrants and certainly not people from former French colonies.  
Despite the union of the far-right parties, the FN was an insignificant political 
party in the 1970s, rarely achieving national success. In the 1980s, the party began to 
achieve small scale successes, such as in 1983 when the FN won ten percent of the vote 
in the European Parliament elections. Its notoriety snowballed in the mid-to-late 1980s 
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when the FN won legislative seats and an increased proportion of popular votes. In the 
1988 presidential elections, Le Pen received 14 percent of the vote. This support 
increased marginally and later stagnated in the 1990s.71 From the 1990s to the late 2000s, 
the FN saw a fluctuation in support leading to a remarkably strong showing of 17.8 
percent in the 2002 presidential election and a considerably low showing of 4.3 percent in 
the 2007 legislative elections.72 Jean-Marie Le Pen announced his retirement the 
following year, to begin in 2010, and the 2010 regional elections marked a turn-around 
for the FN, as it received nearly 12 percent of the vote.73  
Since the FN’s founder, Jean-Marie Le Pen, stepped down in 2010, his daughter, 
Marine Le Pen, has guided the FN to impressive political victories and an ever-increasing 
party base. Marine Le Pen serves as an outspoken critic of current French policies, 
including France’s involvement in free trade, France’s membership in the EU, and 
France’s level of participation in NATO. In support of its opposition role, the FN 
routinely criticizes current French politics as corrupt.74  
Marine Le Pen has also made a concerted effort to distance the FN from its past 
reputation of racism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia.75 The FN’s strong protectionist 
policy can be seen as consistent with its strict anti-immigration stance. The FN founder, 
Jean-Marie Le Pen, routinely criticized French Jews. The anti-Semitic and racist 
reputation of the FN derived from many political gaffes. Jean-Marie Le Pen described the 
Holocaust as a “detail” during World War II.76 In the 1980s, Anne Tristan went 
undercover to examine the inner workings of the FN. She emerged with harrowing tales 
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of xenophobia and anti-Semitism which further degraded the FN’s image.77 Only 
recently have members of the French Jewish population moved back towards the right 
and support for the FN.78 
Marine Le Pen’s battle to redefine the FN has been met with considerable success 
since 2011. In the 2014 EP elections, the FN was the top French party, increasing its 
share of EP seats from three to 24. The FN controls 24 of the 74 French seats.79 The FN’s 
brand of grassroots political activism and propaganda has appealed to the working class 
and promoted the nationalism so long sought by Jean-Marie Le Pen. The FN was among 
the first French political parties with a website. It has literature, gear, cartoons, and other 
“soft power” mechanisms to convey its message. Even if the FN does not fully succeed in 
dominating French politics, its message has undoubtedly influenced the prominent 
political parties. The adjustment of the mainstream political parties’ positions to the FN’s 
far-right policies shows the FN’s influence, such as the moderate right toughening its 
immigration stance. Still, the opposition has been quick to publicly decry the FN’s 
progress. Manuel Valls, the French Prime Minister, said in March 2015 that the FN’s 
policies were a “disaster” and encouraged his supporters to “make sure that the [FN’s] 
score is lower.”80 
In the 2015 French local elections, the FN campaigned on the theme of the EU’s 
policies as a source of France’s domestic problems.81 This euroscepticism garnered the 
FN the highest percentage of votes it has ever received—over 25 percent in the first 
round and 22 percent in the second round. Due to the electoral system in France that 
favors established political parties, the FN gained only 62 out of 3,700 seats.82 The 
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French electoral system represents the most significant hurdle for the FN to become the 
primary French political party and pursue its goal of a Frexit from the EU and from 
NATO’s integrated military command structure.83 
To repeat, the FN not only advocates a Frexit—it also advocates withdrawal from 
key NATO institutions. Marine Le Pen has pledged a withdrawal from NATO’s 
integrated military command structure similar to the previous withdrawal from this 
structure by President Charles de Gaulle in 1966.84 It was not until 2009, under President 
Nicolas Sarkozy, that France returned to full participation in most NATO institutions. Le 
Pen’s proposed course in international politics is alarming to many Europeans and 
Americans. Her ominous pledges are seen in the light of her party’s financial connections 
with the Russian government.85 The FN has received funding from Russian banks, and 
Russia is suspected of funding other eurosceptic political parties to destabilize the EU.86 
While most Western political leaders avoided Russia’s 2015 May Day parade due to the 
Ukraine crisis, Marine Le Pen triumphantly appeared at the May Day rally in support of 
Russian President Vladimir Putin.87 
C. COMPARISON OF BRITISH AND FRENCH EUROSCEPTIC PARTIES 
Understanding the UKIP’s and the FN’s origins and evolution provides context to 
their similarities and differences. An initial glance depicts both parties as anti-EU, anti-
immigration, and populist. All of these traits invoke a strong nationalist sentiment among 
their supporter—another key similarity contributing to their popularity. Careful analysis 
shows that the differences between the two parties are significant. As suggested 
previously, their differences actually began with their origins. The UKIP formed as an 
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anti-EU party while the FN formed as a strong nationalist party. Due to the limited scope 
of this chapter, only the major international policies will be explored. 
When comparing the two parties, Le Pen admits, “OK, we don’t have the same 
economic policies [but the UKIP] share our point of view on the European Union and 
immigration: everyone must control his borders, European technocrats must disappear, 
the European Soviet Union must collapse, everyone must have their own currency, their 
economic policy and decide in their own home.”88 In a letter to the editor of the Daily 
Telegraph (UK) in 2010, Farage repudiated a recommendation that Le Pen model the FN 
after the UKIP. “She has a lot to do to move it towards the free-trading, non-sectarian, 
liberal and non-racist party that is UKIP.”89 The UKIP sums up its differences with the 
FN via Steven Woolfe, the UKIP spokesman on Financial Affairs and Migration:  
UKIP wants a free-enterprise, lightly regulated, globally trading Britain. It 
wants an immigration policy that doesn’t discriminate in favour of EU 
citizens against those from the rest of the world and recognises our ties to 
our Commonwealth partners. Madame Le Pen’s party, on the other hand, 
wants an economy dominated by state intervention, by trade 
protectionism, by high social welfare spending and trade union influence. 
It wants France to establish immigration barriers against the citizens of its 
former colonies.90 
Woolfe’s letter highlights some of the significant differences between the two 
parties: economic policies and parameters of anti-immigration policies. The only true 
similarities between the UKIP and FN are their stated intent to leave the EU, some 
domestic policies, and their desire for increased national sovereignty; however, even 
these similarities have different rationales. 
The strongest—and perhaps only true—similarity is both parties’ commitment to 
leave the EU. Both parties agree that the EU reduces their national sovereignty and that 
EU policies have increased immigration problems. The UKIP’s website notes, “A vote 
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for UKIP is a vote to leave the EU and recover power over our national life.”91 Le Pen 
takes a harsher tone, “I expect one thing only from the European system and that’s for it 
to explode.”92 Nationalism is invoked due to the fear of a loss of autonomy to Brussels—
the headquarters of the EU. The UKIP and the FN view the EU as a subversive, resource-
stripping institution which has already demonstrated its damaging potential. Both parties 
attribute current domestic problems as consequences of EU membership. The FN’s policy 
document states, “The results [of EU membership] are known: open borders inducing 
relocation, unemployment, market dictatorship, destruction of public services, insecurity, 
poverty, mass immigration.”93 Opponents to the UKIP and the FN may agree that the EU 
is a source of problems but advocate reform instead of withdrawal.94 A key example of 
this is the early 2016 effort by UK Prime Minister David Cameron, who is lobbying for 
concessions to keep Britain in the EU. 
Their primary differences concern immigration and xenophobia, defense, foreign 
policy, and economic policies. Of utmost concern for the UKIP is the unwanted 
affiliation to a party with a history of racism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia. The UKIP 
evidently considers that it has due cause to avoid association with the FN’s reputation as 
a racist, anti-Semitic, and xenophobic party. The UKIP already battles its own 
accusations of racism, islamophobia, and homophobia—notably from one of its 
staunchest critics, founder Alan Sked.95 Sked’s critique of the UKIP now seems to go 
against his past beliefs. When Sked was with the UKIP, he and Farage solicited Enoch 
Powell (1912–1998) to run for office under the UKIP ticket to support their anti-
immigration agenda.96 Powell was a controversial anti-immigration figure. His “Rivers 
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of Blood” speech in 1968 was widely regarded as racist.97 Regardless, Farage and Sked 
have both expressed admiration and reverence towards Powell.98 
Concerning immigration, each party has a different rationale behind its stance. 
Each party’s anti-immigration policies straddle the line between nationalism, racism, and 
xenophobia. Both parties emphasize their native countries’ languages. The UKIP and the 
FN’s websites and literature are solely in their official language. The UKIP’s 
immigration policy is that EU citizens can come to the UK and seek British citizenship if 
they speak English, and have a job, housing, and health insurance.99 The FN’s 
immigration policy is that French citizenship can be earned after demonstrating a strong 
commitment to France and its language. The FN would also limit legal immigrants to 
10,000 per year (down from 200,000), prohibit dual-nationality for non-Europeans, and 
favor French citizens for social services and employment.100 
Critics have deplored these proposed policies as manifestations of racism, while 
supporters have dismissed such criticisms and have asserted that such policies are 
necessary to preserve the country’s national identity. David Cameron has claimed that the 
UKIP is “closet racist.”101 Farage has also made perceived gaffes in this regard. For 
example, he once suggested that genetics played a role in explaining why poorer children 
performed less successfully in school. Additionally, former UKIP MEP Nikki Sinclaire 
claimed that UKIP is “without a doubt homophobic.”102 In 2012, Jose Manuel Barroso, 
then the EU Commission President, referred to these parties as “extremes” and 
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encouraged citizens to defend the European Union.103 In 2014, Germany’s foreign 
minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, called these parties “brainless.”104 
For defense and foreign policy, the two parties are very different. The FN has a 
stated goal of withdrawing France from NATO’s integrated military command 
structure.105 Among the rationales that Le Pen has expressed to leave the NATO 
command structure is the inability within this structure to use any means necessary to 
defend France from threats—to include torture.106 Further, the FN wishes to distance 
itself from the United States, maintain the autonomy of France’s forces by exiting the EU 
and NATO, increase France’s defense spending by almost 25 percent, and bolster 
France’s navy.107 On the other hand, the UKIP wishes to maintain strong ties with the 
United States, fully fund the United Kingdom’s military, and honor British veterans.108 
The FN is not only anti-EU and anti-NATO; it has also expressed an intention to distance 
France from the United States. Le Pen has praised Russia and President Vladimir Putin; 
and some analysts believe that if the FN assumes control of the French government, 
Russia will have a sympathetic partner in Western Europe. Further evidence of the ties 
between the FN and Russia is apparent in loans requested by and given to the group. As 
of December 2014, the FN received a €9.4 million loan from the First Czech Russian 
bank in Moscow.109 Again in February 2016, Le Pen reportedly requested an additional 
€27 million loan from a bank with ties to Russia.110 
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Another difference is their opposing economic policies. The UKIP wishes to 
promote free-trade and “continue to enjoy ‘most favoured nation’ status in trade with the 
EU, as is required under [World Trade Organization] rules.”111 Conversely, the FN 
advocates protectionism that restricts free trade in favor of French businesses.112  
D. FUTURE PROSPECTS: A UKIP–FN ALLIANCE? 
The future prospects for both parties appear strong despite the lack of progress in 
national elections. Their nationalist appeal has earned them increased support, and the 
EU’s economic problems have only benefited their cause. The joint anti-EU cause could 
be an area in which the two parties form an alliance. In politics, there is power in 
numbers. Could a potential alliance between the two—especially in the European 
Parliament—result in a stronger anti-EU movement? Can the parties reach a consensus? 
The alliance discussion began in 2010, before Marine Le Pen took over leadership 
of the FN. At first, the UKIP was partially open to a potential alliance. In response to a 
question about a possible modeling of the FN after the UKIP, Farage dismissed it but 
remarked, “Maybe we should, instead, give her a cautious welcome.”113 This cautious 
welcome was short-lived, and the public bickering between the two parties has persisted.  
Le Pen routinely compares her party to the UKIP while Farage has attempted to 
distance his party from the FN. Le Pen believes that the two are publicly keeping their 
distance due to “electoral considerations.”114 In early 2014, Farage was blunt, “Look, 
we’ve made it clear that we don’t intend to do a political deal at any point with [the] 
French National Front.”115 Months later, in May 2014, Farage went on record 
acknowledging the common policies between the UKIP and the FN and hinted at 
possibly voting with the FN to block certain EU legislation—a so-called “blocking 
minority.” Farage remarked, “As a strictly non-racist and libertarian party, UKIP will be 
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ploughing our own furrow in Europe with parties with which we are happy to do business 
and make a stand against the EU’s political union.”116 Although they have this in 
common, the UKIP has repeatedly indicated that it does not wish to align with the FN to 
further the “destruction of the EU.” In response, Marine Le Pen told the Daily Telegraph, 
“They say they’re [UKIP] not in agreement with us. My foot.”117  
As noted previously, the UKIP has attempted to distance itself from the FN 
because it views the FN as extreme. The UKIP wishes to stay more moderate while the 
FN readily advertises its far-right rhetoric. As further evidence of the UKIP’s 
commitment to distance itself from racism or anti-Semitism, the party suspended a 
member for making disparaging remarks on Twitter on Islam and Nigerians.118 
In October 2014, the UKIP’s EP group, Europe of Freedom and Direct 
Democracy, collapsed, killing the EP’s largest anti-EU group and reducing the UKIP’s 
influence and funding. This collapse was short-lived as the second iteration of the party 
was re-established a few days later. This type of setback could pave the way towards 
closer coordination with the FN.119  
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IV. ANALYSIS: BREXIT/FREXIT IMPLICATIONS 
What are the prospects of a Brexit, Frexit, or both? Since 2011, euroscepticism 
has gained significant traction in European politics. With each electoral success for the 
eurosceptic parties, both Britain and France demonstrate an increasing potential for 
withdrawing from the EU. In Britain, both the Conservatives and the UKIP have 
exploited a litany of factors to gain support and win elections on the Brexit referendum 
promise.120 Based on opinion polls and electoral results, there is a strong potential for a 
Brexit if a referendum was held today.121 A Frexit has a strong potential of occurring if 
France’s FN gains control of the French government. If FN succeeds, the likelihood of 
strong popular support for a Frexit is assumed because France primarily campaigns on 
the promise of a French withdrawal from the EU.122  
The largest threat to the EU is posed by France and the United Kingdom as they 
are two of the largest holders of EP seats. Additionally, the UKIP and the FN are the 
most prominent eurosceptic parties and their 2014 election successes worry both 
domestic and EU politicians. The prospects for a British or French withdrawal from the 
EU are encumbered by many challenges, but if it did happen, what would follow for the 
EU? What would happen to France and the UK? The answers would be largely 
speculative as there is much existing debate and numerous unknown variables. 
For the British and French withdrawals from the EU, the terms Brexit and Frexit 
have been coined by Denis MacShane, a former UK Labour minister. MacShane believes 
that if the UK has a Brexit referendum, France will likely follow suit. Upon hearing of a 
promised British referendum, Marine Le Pen praised David Cameron and remarked, “I 
will be Madame Frexit if the European Union doesn’t give us back our monetary, 
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legislative, territorial and budget sovereignty.”123 MacShane believes that there will be 
total “chaos” in the event of a referendum.124  
In the event of a Brexit or Frexit, the EU has a strong likelihood of surviving as it 
has 26 other member countries as of 2016. The membership number has almost doubled 
since 2004. While Britain and France may not believe that they need the EU, many other 
EU countries benefit greatly from membership. 2014 and 2015 Eurobarometer polls 
indicate that many other countries’ citizens trust the EU, believe they have a voice, and 
approve of the overall impact of the EU. Naturally, there are points of contention among 
the other states, but the overall sentiment is positive.125  
On the British and French front, if adequate planning is undertaken, it is possible 
that neither country would suffer severe effects from an EU withdrawal. Undoubtedly, 
withdrawal would present difficulties. The loss of EU immigration policies would turn 
two million Britons working in other EU countries into illegal immigrants.126 On the 
financial front, a report by UK economists seems to reject the eurosceptic claims of the 
EU hampering the UK’s economic growth.127 Conversely, an EU exit might have a 
negative impact on the British pound or the French franc—if France also left the 
Eurozone and returned to the franc as its currency. (Whether France could withdraw from 
the Eurozone separately from exiting the EU is another question.) If adequately planned, 
the negative impact might be manageable. Strong economic policies in each country 
should allow a smooth transition. There will also be a loss of trade agreements through 
associations with the EU. In 2013, 19 British business leaders warned against a Brexit.128 
To combat this line of argument, the UKIP claims that the loss of EU trade agreements 
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would be compensated by new agreements giving Britain stronger economic 
autonomy.129 
The real loser could be the EU. The EU relies upon the funding from these two 
prominent countries. The economic interdependence does promote this international 
institution, and economists believe that membership in the EU is a benefit to member 
states.130 Other EU countries may have to compensate for the deficit. More alarming is 
the potential of other countries following suit—the domino effect. Countries on the brink 
of EU withdrawal may actually withdraw shortly following a British or French departure. 
In a doomsday scenario, the EU may collapse if other countries follow France’s or 
Britain’s exit.  
A. PROGRESSION OF EU SECURITY AND DEFENSE 
Defense and security in the EU is currently based on the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP), derived from authorities granted in Article 42 of the 2009 
Lisbon Treaty.131 The CSDP is only the most recent in a long history of efforts to 
increase European collective security and defense. In 1950 France proposed the European 
Defense Community (EDC) to integrate defense. France’s parliament failed to approve 
France’s EDC proposal, and the measure was not adopted.132 As decades of the Cold 
War passed, European Union members slowly increased their military capabilities. In 
1992, the Maastricht Treaty created the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which was 
a significant step in the development of a collective European policy in this domain. Then 
in 1998, the Saint Malo Declaration represented another significant step as two great 
powers—Britain and France—agreed to give the EU decision making authority to 
respond to crises when NATO was not involved. The Berlin Plus agreement of 2003 
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again provided options for the EU to act with, borrow from, and collaborate with 
NATO—especially promising for the six EU members not in NATO.133 
This very succinct outline of the EU security and defense progression does not do 
justice to the painstaking efforts undertaken by generations of pro-EU politicians to 
ensure peace and prosperity for Europe. Many eurosceptics believe in the value of 
defense cooperation, but reject reliance on the EU in this domain. Additionally, critics 
routinely identify the problems with the inefficiency and lack of capable force presented 
by the defense treaties and agreements. The Berlin Plus agreement, for example, is 
constrained by the requirement for consensus of the NATO nations. If a NATO member 
disagrees with NATO support for the proposed EU action, that support can be blocked 
and the Berlin Plus arrangement would not apply. Additionally, the framework for an EU 
army exists in Article 42 of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, but the inability of the EU member 
nations to agree has made the article ineffective. In short, the inability to achieve 
consensus has prevented progress.134 
This raises the question of the EU army. As discussed below, two opinions over 
60 years apart demonstrate the perennial issue of an EU army. Proponents of the EU 
army believe the collective effort will save money, strengthen the union, develop 
common foreign and security policies, and increase the deterrent effects of a strong 
European military body. Opponents of the EU Army are wary of the loss of military 
sovereignty, suspicious of the EU’s centralization intent, and believe NATO already 
performs the collective defense function well.135 
The EU army has been a notion debated since the end of World War II, and it has 
coincided with other efforts to increase European collective security and defense. 
Attempts to create an EU military have resulted short of any capable force. In 1951, 
German newspapers used political cartoons to show skepticism and disapproval of such a 
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force fearing their soldiers would be thrown into the “American Stew.”136 Again in 1951, 
French General Marie-Emile Bethouart was perhaps well ahead of his time in an article 
he penned advocating an EU army. He remarked, “We must pool our resources,” and 
further named the pre-requisite for the EU army was the creation of a “supranational 
authority.” That supranational authority was established in 1993 as the European Union. 
Among the benefits highlighted, Bethouart mentioned the efficiency of an EU army, the 
joint budget, and the “formation of a European spirit.” Bethouart conceded the primary 
difficulty would be the lack of “patriotism or a real European spirit.”137 
Perhaps unwittingly, General Bethouart’s comments were echoed by European 
Commission President Jean Claude Juncker nearly 64 years later in 2015. Juncker called 
for an EU Army to pool EU resources, increase efficiency, and present a common foreign 
and security policy.138 “With its own army, Europe could react more credibly to the 
threat to peace in a member’s state or in a neighboring state,” remarked Juncker.139 Both 
Juncker and Bethouart made their cases for an EU army in the face of an unpredictable, 
nuclear-armed Russia. Juncker directly mentioned Russia and its threat to Eastern 
European nations. Bethouart wrote his article just two years after the Soviet Union 
became a nuclear power and was undoubtedly motivated by Cold War tensions. 
B. NATO–EU RELATIONSHIP 
To understand the potential effects of a Brexit or Frexit from the EU on NATO, it 
is necessary to understand the relationship between the EU and NATO. Although the two 
organizations share certain objectives, NATO and the EU are distinct organizations with 
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decidedly different responsibilities.140 They cooperate, compete, and complement each 
other through informal and formal agreements.141 The cooperation has been impeded by 
lack of consensus and interstate conflicts between members, such as Turkey (which is not 
a member of the EU) and Cyprus (which is not a member of NATO). Although there 
have been informal and formal agreements, the relationship between the EU and NATO 
has been inherently lopsided, with NATO taking on most of the military security 
responsibilities. 
With a relatively sub-optimal record of cooperation in military and security 
matters, there are few similarities among the two organizations. NATO was formed as 
primarily a collective defense organization, and the EU was formed primarily as an 
economic and political union. NATO was formed in 1949 “to defend its members from 
external coercion or aggression.”142 The EU was formed after a progression of economic 
and political treaties beginning with the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. 
Quite simply, while there are some theoretical similarities in capabilities, the EU and 
NATO currently perform distinct tasks.  
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, both organizations have undergone mission 
changes. Today, there are some responsibilities undertaken by both organizations, and the 
deciding factor allowing one organization to perform the functions has often been 
funding. NATO is well funded and suited for military operations while the EU is not as 
well funded but well suited for law enforcement operations. When explaining the distinct 
roles in Afghanistan, two authors commented, “The U.S. [and NATO] is teaching the 
Afghanistan National Police (ANP) how to shoot; Europe is teaching the ANP when not 
to shoot.”143 The informal agreements between the two organizations in their Kosovo and 
Afghanistan operations highlighted the funding disparities. In Kosovo, informal 
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agreements were originally intended for EU personnel to take primary law enforcement 
and rule of law roles. Funding and manning shortages ultimately compelled NATO to 
play the primary role in pursuing top criminals in the Balkans. This scenario appeared 
again in Afghanistan; the EU was intended to take the lead on police reform but only 
allocated a paltry $63 million (USD) in funding.144 The United States and other NATO 
forces, on the other hand, provided $1.6–1.7 billion (USD) in funding.145 Thus, the 
NATO mission included taking the lead on police reform. It should be noted, however, 
that 22 EU members are also members of NATO. 
NATO expanded its responsibilities to include crisis management and cooperative 
security functions after the collapse of the Soviet Union. With each organization 
expanding its roles, a breakthrough occurred in the Berlin-Plus agreement, a formal 
security cooperation accord between the EU and NATO. Unfortunately, the only current 
EU-led mission facilitated by the agreement is the Althea operation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.146 Other attempts to use this formal mechanism have been met with vetoes 
by Turkey due to its disagreements with Cyprus.147 
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) were two economic unions that included political collaboration due to 
necessity. Especially after the destruction of much of Europe in World War II, the liberal 
tenet of economic interdependence was highly encouraged by the United States. The 
influx of funding from the Marshall Plan and U.S. investments in industries slowly 
rebuilt Europe. This interdependence necessitated the formation of economic 
“communities” in which the members shared common interests and goals. The necessity 
of political union came about, in part, by the need for the community to ensure that 
economic rules were being respected by member states.148 
                                                 
144 Graeger and Todd, “EU-NATO,” 1-2. 
145 Ibid., 4. 
146 Ibid., 1–2. 
147 Ibid., 3. 
148 Ginsberg and Penska, European Union, 16–18. 
 36 
The economic and political union that exists now through the EU would not have 
been possible if it were not for an umbrella of NATO collective defense throughout the 
Cold War. NATO and the Western European Union allowed EU member states to place 
more focus on economic prospects than military requirements.149 
C. POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON EU SECURITY AND DEFENSE 
The outcome of a Brexit or Frexit on European collective security and defense is 
difficult to predict. A Brexit or Frexit could re-ignite the EU army discussion amongst the 
remaining members. Alternatively, withdrawal of major powers from the EU could 
destabilize the union and potentially lead to a collapse. The most probable scenario is 
somewhere in the middle—a Brexit or Frexit would have an effect on current EU security 
and defense, but the effect might be mitigated if proper planning was undertaken by EU 
leaders.   
On the other end of the spectrum is the “domino theory.” In summation, a Brexit 
or Frexit may destabilize the EU which could lead to other nations’ withdrawal. This 
scenario has never occurred in such a scale and is purely conjecture. However, such a 
scenario could create significant trust issues and set European cohesion back to the 
situation immediately following World War II. One should not outright dismiss this 
scenario as this is likely what Russia desires.  
The most probable scenario is that a Brexit or Frexit would be a non-event—at 
least in the short term. That is, the current state of EU’s security and defense would not 
be affected by a major power withdrawal. The loss of military manpower and funding 
will be evident, but the EU will likely adjust and continue with existing institutions. This 
scenario is most probable as it would not require a drastic change of mindset of the other 
EU nations. Just because France or Britain exits does not mean other countries share their 
same sentiments. Britain, for example, can be viewed as a pseudo-European nation. They 
have been independent and view the rest of Europe as the continentals. France has also 
been very independent by maintaining pride in their military sovereignty.  
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Another primary factor leading to a likely status quo with EU security and 
defense immediately following a Brexit or Frexit is the ineffective European Defense 
Agency and European Battle Groups.150 The current EU military capabilities are 
underfunded and inferior to many domestic military capacities. Additionally, withdrawal 
from the EU equates to withdrawals from treaties between the France or Britain and the 
EU. New treaties will be required and will likely follow the model France and Britain 
have already undertaken – bilateral or multilateral defense agreements. These agreements 
involve pooling and sharing, joint military training, and other joint activities to improve 
efficiency and pool resources especially in a fiscally austere environment. On an 
economic front, France or Britain could adopt Switzerland’s strategy of treaties and 
agreements between their nation and the EU for specific economic benefits.151 
Furthermore, EU’s security and defense is largely influenced by NATO and the 
Berlin Plus agreement. Collective security is still viewed as largely covered by Article 5 
of the NATO treaty.152 If an aggressor attacks a NATO ally, other allies are committed to 
their defense. Berlin Plus, in a way, extends such an arrangement to the non-NATO 
members of the EU. Unfortunately, the Ukraine crisis has exposed glaring holes in the 
collective willingness of European nations to defend those outside of these treaties.153 
Although this paper argues a Brexit or Frexit is unlikely to affect the current state 
of EU security and defense, this paper’s scope does not attempt to predict long-term 
issues due to the dynamics of international relations. Countless other possibilities could 
occur that could change the course of EU security and defense.  
D. POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON NATO 
As with the potential effects on the EU, the effect of a Brexit or Frexit on NATO 
is also difficult to predict. At one end of the spectrum, a Brexit or Frexit could strengthen 
NATO and its collective defense and crisis management missions. At the other end, the 
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withdrawal of major powers could destabilize both the EU and NATO, and this could 
lead to two ineffective international institutions. Somewhere in the middle may be a 
“status quo” effect with no significant change. The most probable scenario is somewhere 
in the middle—a Brexit or Frexit would result in both the strengthening and weakening of 
NATO and the EU. Additionally, the secondary international effects are the wildcards. 
Other regional powers could fulfill new roles or assume increased responsibilities in and 
outside of both the EU and NATO, such as Germany and Russia. 
An obvious result of a Brexit or Frexit would be the reduction of potential 
security forces and funding at the EU’s disposal. This reduction would not necessarily 
represent a degradation of the EU’s military ability due to existing bilateral and 
multilateral agreements between both EU and non-EU members.154 For example, a 
February 2012 agreement between the UK and France substantially increased security, 
defense, and nuclear weapon cooperation.155 The survival of the EU has no necessary 
bearing on this bilateral agreement, and as such, such agreements could mitigate adverse 
effects on the EU’s ability to organize a military or security force. However, as noted 
above concerning the relationship between the EU and NATO, NATO has carried more 
of the burden.  
Again, this thesis assumes that a Brexit or Frexit could occur. The British do not 
view themselves as European: they kept their British currency instead of adopting the 
euro, they do not have a written constitution like other European nations, and they have 
even abolished the EU identity card.156 Although France is not as anti-EU as Britain, the 
French still hold views unlike those of their European neighbors. France did not 
participate in NATO’s integrated military command structure from 1966 to 2009 and 
maintained a powerful military. The FN asserts that France can handle its own security 
needs via cooperation in bilateral and multilateral military arrangements.157 Thus, these 
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two major powers are unlike the other EU nations and their withdrawal might have a 
marginal effect on the EU (except for the CSDP), and a more significant effect on 
NATO. 
There could be secondary domestic effects from a Brexit or Frexit—some good, 
some bad. Domestically, Britain and France would face different potential benefits and 
consequences from EU withdrawal. The benefits might be similar, as eurosceptics argue 
that an EU withdrawal would return money to their countries, reduce unemployment, 
allow for domestic immigration controls, preserve sovereignty, and empower national 
military establishments. Alternatively, the adverse effects could differ for each country. 
Naturally, the potential adverse effects are emphasized by the pro-EU supporters and fall 
under two categories: domestic and international. 
Pro-EU politicians and analysts have issued warnings of the effects of a Brexit to 
the stability of the UK. A prominent British political commentator, Philip Stephens, has 
argued, “If Britain leaves Europe, Scotland will leave Britain. The union of the United 
Kingdom would not long survive Brexit.”158 Former Labour MEP Denis MacShane also 
believes that a Brexit would lead to a break up of Britain.159  
Naturally, the removal of a great power and contributing member of the EU 
would cause near-term challenges within the EU bureaucracy. Issues of funding, 
delegates, country-specific rules, and treaties would require overhaul. Smaller EU 
nations—like Portugal—would receive less money from the EU and larger EU nations—
such as Germany—would likely be required to increase their already disproportionate 
share.  
Furthermore, the EU’s security and defense are largely influenced by NATO and 
the Lisbon Treaty, and to a lesser extent, the Berlin Plus agreement. Collective defense is 
still viewed as largely covered by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.160 If an 
aggressor attacks a NATO ally, the other allies are committed to its defense. 
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Unfortunately, the Ukraine crisis has exposed glaring holes in the collective willingness 
of European nations to defend those outside the key Euro-Atlantic treaties.161 
1. Scenario 1: Split Decision 
This scenario assumes that there is a strong possibility of France withdrawing 
from NATO if a Frexit from the EU occurs. Additionally, there is a high likelihood that 
Britain would remain in NATO and continue to provide strong support to the 
organization. France’s FN campaigns on strong nationalism and withdrawal from 
international organizations. If the FN rose to power in France, it would likely carry that 
same popular support to withdraw from both the EU and NATO. Britain has no such anti-
NATO movement. Since the EU would be left with a glaring hole in its international and 
continental European relations, it is assessed that Britain would rely upon NATO more 
than it has recently.  
2. Scenario 2: No Effects 
A second possible outcome is that a Brexit or Frexit from the EU would have no 
effect on NATO. NATO would exist as a collective defense organization picking up the 
slack from undermanned and underfunded EU operations within Europe and abroad. 
Similar to the British example in the first scenario, a Brexit or Frexit might even bolster 
dedication to the NATO alliance. In the long term, unless dramatically significant events 
occur, Britain and France would continue to stay in NATO. In addition, because two 
major powers withdrew from the EU, NATO’s crisis management responsibilities could 
increase due to a lack of capability or funding from the EU. NATO has already 
performed this role—in Kosovo and Afghanistan—but its role could increase as NATO 
could be the main international organization which includes Britain and/or France.  
 Furthermore, new treaties would be required and would likely follow the model 
that France and Britain have already undertaken—bilateral or multilateral defense 
agreements. These agreements involve pooling and sharing, joint military training, and 
other joint activities to improve efficiency and pool resources, especially in a fiscally 
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austere environment. On an economic front, France or Britain could adopt Switzerland’s 
strategy of treaties and agreements with the EU for specific economic benefits.162 
3. Scenario 3: Complete Loss of Confidence 
A third possible outcome would be at the other end of the spectrum: Britain or 
France (or both) could withdraw from NATO and bring about a “domino effect,” causing 
other European nations to lose confidence in the EU and/or NATO. This possible 
outcome would pose the most questions and require the greatest changes in Western 
foreign policies. Moreover, such a scenario could create significant trust issues and set 
European cohesion back to the situation immediately following World War II. One 
should not outright dismiss this scenario as this is probably what Russia desires. In a 
1943 analysis of the Soviet vision for the future of continental Europe, Charles Bohlen, 
the First Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in the Soviet Union, remarked that the Soviet 
idea was that “Germany is to be broken up and kept broken up,” “eastern, southeastern 
and central Europe will not be permitted to group themselves into any federations,” and 
“France is to be stripped of her colonies.” The analysis concluded, “The result would be 
that the Soviet Union would be the only important military and political force on the 
continent of Europe. The rest of Europe would be reduced to military and political 
impotence.”163 
E. SECONDARY INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS 
Secondary effects could be provoked by the perceived instability of the EU or 
NATO. For example, in the event of a Brexit and/or a Frexit, Germany’s position as the 
most populous and economically prosperous EU nation might allow it to dominate 
Europe and the EU. To some, such a German revival is exactly what NATO was 
supposed to prevent following World War II. Some observers have continued to 
champion a formula often attributed to NATO’s first secretary general, Lord Hastings 
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Ismay, “NATO was designed to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the 
Germans down.”164  
Additionally, the fear of Germany falling under the control of an authoritarian 
ruler supported by populism and propaganda frightens some experts because it is 
comparable to what is occurring in Russia today and what happened in Germany in the 
interwar period. The Russian factor must also be considered. It is well known that 
President Vladimir Putin has disdain for NATO, but it is not fully known what efforts he 
will undertake to degrade the alliance. 
As a counter argument to a weakened EU as a result of a Brexit and/or Frexit, the 
absence of those major powers could lead to the constitution of an EU Army. France and 
Britain have been major impediments to the EU army debate because of their national 
traditions. Meanwhile, Germany has been an advocate of a European military force.165 In 
2007, German Chancellor Angela Merkel remarked, “In the European Union we have to 
come closer to the creation of a European army.”166 Merkel has called for an EU army 
almost every year. In September 2015, Merkel again called for an EU army—only this 
time she reportedly attempted to leverage Britain’s proposed EU renegotiation. 
Reportedly, Merkel would drop German opposition to British renegotiation if David 
Cameron dropped his opposition to an EU army.167  
In the event of a Brexit and/or Frexit, the EU army discussion could gain new 
momentum as one or two of the major powers would no longer raise a dissenting voice in 
the debate. German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen remarked, “Our future as 
Europeans will at some point be with a European Army,” and it will “strengthen Europe’s 
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security.”168 Germany—as a robust economic and military power—has positioned itself 
as the main proponent of a collective EU military to benefit the security and prosperity of 
the union it so strongly supports. MacShane believes Germany’s power would rise in the 
event of a Brexit: 
A Brexit will change the course of history and the contours of European 
politics. The EU without Britain will be increasingly dominated by 
Germany—by far the biggest nation, with the strongest economy, which is 
increasingly integrated with Poland and new EU member states in east and 
central Europe. European Germany will give way to German Europe. 
France will have to accept junior partner status, subordinate to Germany, 
or seek to create a coalition of dissent with Spain and Italy, a triple 
alliance of the weakest of the big EU member states.169 
Additionally, the Russians have been overtly and subversively attempting to 
destabilize Western international institutions. To many, Russia has become the 
preeminent threat to EU security and defense. In a May 2015 speech, U.S. Vice President 
Joe Biden remarked that the Russian aggression in Ukraine has “transformed the 
landscape of European security.” In Biden’s words, “As it tries to rattle the cage, the 
Kremlin is working hard to buy-off and co-opt European political forces, funding both 
right wing and left wing anti systemic parties throughout Europe.” Biden further 
explained, “President Putin sees such political … forces as useful tools to be 
manipulated, to create cracks in the European body politic which he can then exploit.”170 
As documented earlier, France’s FN is one of those parties that may be susceptible to 
manipulation by Russia through funding. The Russian factor is an unpredictable influence 
in any potential scenario. If Russia succeeds at steering eurosceptic parties in its favor, an 
alliance could emerge which would alter international politics and potentially the 
argument of this thesis. 
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In early 2016, the upcoming British referendum on whether to exit the EU 
repeatedly appeared in the headlines of major international newspapers. For some 
observers, the referendum became an alarming reality when PM David Cameron 
announced that it would occur in June 2016. Few outside Britain and Europe understand 
what a Brexit could mean for Britain, Europe, NATO, and the world. It is easy to dismiss 
this event as a local political squabble. In reality, however, this event could pose 
significant problems for international politics and United States foreign policy. 
A Brexit or Frexit would almost certainly change the dynamics of domestic and 
international politics in Europe. The severity of this change is unknown because the 
adverse effects might be mitigated with sound planning and leadership. This leadership 
would require significant diplomatic relations and negotiations to compensate for the loss 
of military, economic, legal, and political agreements organic to inclusion in the EU.  
The secondary international effects are the wildcards in this assessment. What 
would Germany do with clear majority power in the EU? What would Russia do with a 
weakened EU or NATO? These thought-provoking questions are subjects for speculation 
and future research.  
Alternatively, there still remains a strong possibility that a Brexit or Frexit will 
not occur. Voters and politicians could conclude that the EU’s problems do not outweigh 
the benefits of inclusion in the EU. The British population could simply vote that they 
want to stay in the EU. An outcome like this would probably strengthen the EU and quell 
eurosceptic sentiment. It is unlikely that eurosceptic parties will disappear, but these 
parties may not have as much confidence in their chances in future referendums.  
Regardless of the British referendum outcome, the eurosceptic movement will 
continue to gain support if immigration, terrorism, financial instability, or unemployment 
remain concerns. These issues are covered extensively by media outlets regardless of 
their actual severity. The more these concerns appear to be dire problems, the more likely 
the eurosceptic movement will persist. For example, if the Islamic State perpetrates 
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another high profile attack in Europe—of which the threat was assessed as high by 
Europol in January 2016171—the eurosceptic parties will likely attempt to capitalize on 
the event. These eurosceptic parties may use such events to advocate stricter control of 
borders, more rigorous immigration quotas, and restrictive limits on further European 
integration—much akin to the arguments set out by France’s FN after the Paris attacks in 
2015.172 Moreover, the eurosceptic parties may use such events to continue to advocate 
withdrawal from the EU. 
Perhaps the ultimate fear for United States foreign policy strategists is the 
potential destabilization of international institutions—not limited to the EU. International 
institutions are critical to the national security policy of the United States. The 
destabilization of international institutions in the face of Putin’s Russia, the Islamic State, 
and persistent Eurozone problems should set off alarms. Russia could continue to violate 
sovereign borders, the Islamic State could continue to take advantage of freedom of 
movement, and the financial problems with the Eurozone—one of the largest economies 
in the world—could have global effects. For these reasons, it is clear that euroscepticism 
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